Search Results - "Stefánsson, H"

On the Limits of the Precautionary Principle by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays an…”
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Against the De Minimis Principle by Lundgren, Björn, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if the risk is…”
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How a pure risk of harm can itself be a harm: A reply to Rowe by Stefánsson, H Orri

“…Rowe has recently argued that pure risk of harm cannot itself be a harm. I respond to Rowe and argue that given an appropriate understanding of objective…”
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Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some…”
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A trilemma for the lexical utility model of the precautionary principle by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) and Steel and Bartha (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the…”
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Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance by Orri, Stefánsson H

“…The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a…”
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Additively-separable and rank-discounted variable-population social welfare functions: A characterization by Spears, Dean, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size populations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized…”
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The Tragedy of the Risk Averse by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down some gambles with positive monetary expectations, are nevertheless often willing to accept…”
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Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle by Arrhenius, Gustaf, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Parfit (Theoria 82:110–127, 2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing imprecise equality. However, Parfit’s notion…”
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Fairness and risk attitudes by Bradley, Richard, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…According to a common judgement, a social planner should often use a lottery to decide which of two people should receive a good. This judgement undermines one…”
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Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers by Orri, Stefánsson H

“…A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for…”
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How Valuable Are Chances? by Stefánsson, H. Orri, Bradley, Richard

“…Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical…”
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Population ethics under risk by Arrhenius, Gustaf, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Population axiology concerns how to rank populations by the relation “is socially preferred to”. So far, population ethicists have (with important exceptions)…”
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Radical interpretation and decision theory by Hattiangadi, Anandi, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation…”
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Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle? by Lundgren, Björn, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de…”
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Belief Revision for Growing Awareness by Steele, Katie, Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to…”
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What Is 'Real' in Probabilism? by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and…”
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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such…”
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Gambling with Death by Orri, Stefánsson H

“…Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gamble, I…”
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Catastrophic risk by Stefánsson, H. Orri

“…Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical importance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define 'catastrophe' and…”
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