Search Results - "Shmaya, Eran"

The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring by SHMAYA, ERAN

“…An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after…”
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THE INTERVAL STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE by Guo, Yingni, Shmaya, Eran

“…A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff-relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the…”
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Regret‐Minimizing Project Choice by Guo, Yingni, Shmaya, Eran

“…An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We…”
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A qualitative approach to quantum probability by Lehrer, Ehud, Shmaya, Eran

“…A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. The question arises as to when such an order can be represented by a…”
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Costly miscalibration by Guo, Yingni, Shmaya, Eran

“…We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the…”
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Large strategic dynamic interactions by Kalai, Ehud, Shmaya, Eran

“…The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group…”
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Rental harmony with roommates by Azrieli, Yaron, Shmaya, Eran

“…We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods…”
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Identifying the deviator by Alon, Noga, Gunby, Benjamin, He, Xiaoyu, Shmaya, Eran, Solan, Eilon

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Lipschitz Games by Azrieli, Yaron, Shmaya, Eran

“…The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that…”
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Experiments on Decisions under Uncertainty: A Theoretical Framework by Shmaya, Eran, Yariv, Leeat

“…The analysis of lab data entails a joint test of the underlying theory and of subjects' conjectures regarding the experimental design itself how subjects frame…”
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The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content by Chambers, Christopher P., Echenique, Federico, Shmaya, Eran

“…We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that the empirical content of a…”
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Unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary Bewley–Aiyagari model by Hu, Tai-Wei, Shmaya, Eran

“…We prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium in a Bewley–Aiyagari model with idiosyncratic shocks. This is an exchange economy…”
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General revealed preference theory by Chambers, Christopher P, Echenique, Federico, Shmaya, Eran

“…We generalize the standard revealed preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed preference formulation of an…”
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Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence by Lehrer, Ehud, Rosenberg, Dinah, Shmaya, Eran

“…In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature…”
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Recursive utility and parameter uncertainty by Al-Najjar, Nabil I., Shmaya, Eran

“…We explore how the Epstein–Zin utility captures an agent's sensitivity to parameter uncertainty. Our main result is a closed-form representation of the…”
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Many inspections are manipulable by Shmaya, Eran

“…A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test…”
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Signaling and mediation in games with common interests by Lehrer, Ehud, Rosenberg, Dinah, Shmaya, Eran

“…Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on…”
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Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment by Al-Najjar, Nabil I., Shmaya, Eran

“…A Bayesian agent relies on past observations to learn the structure of a stationary process. We show that the agent's predictions about near-horizon events…”
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Uncertainty and Disagreement in Equilibrium Models by Al-Najjar, Nabil I., Shmaya, Eran

“…Leading equilibrium concepts require agents’ beliefs to coincide with the model’s true probabilities and thus be free of systematic errors. This implicitly…”
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Collective Upkeep by Madsen, Erik, Shmaya, Eran

“…We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic non-monetary contributions. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by concentrating…”
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