Search Results - "Sheremeta, Roman M"

Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects, and Individual Preferences in Contests by Price, Curtis R., Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely…”
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Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games by Cason, Timothy N., Sheremeta, Roman M., Zhang, Jingjing

“…Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report…”
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Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games by Cason, Timothy N., Sheremeta, Roman M., Zhang, Jingjing

“…Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further…”
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments by Dechenaux, Emmanuel, Kovenock, Dan, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a…”
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BEHAVIOR IN GROUP CONTESTS: A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH by Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team‐incentives within firms, and…”
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You can't put old wine in new bottles: the effect of newcomers on coordination in groups by McCarter, Matthew W, Sheremeta, Roman M

“…A common finding in social sciences is that member change hinders group functioning and performance. However, questions remain as to why member change…”
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OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS by Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments: (i) overbidding…”
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Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas by McCarter, Matthew W., Samek, Anya, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…The current social dilemma literature lacks theoretical consensus regarding how individuals behave when facing multiple simultaneous social dilemmas. The…”
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CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION by SHEREMETA, ROMAN M.

“…This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal…”
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Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests by Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the…”
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Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results by Cason, Timothy N., Masters, William A., Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all…”
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Status and the demand for visible goods: experimental evidence on conspicuous consumption by Clingingsmith, David, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…Some economists argue that consumption of publicly visible goods is driven by social status. Making a causal inference about this claim is difficult with…”
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions by Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, Sheremeta, Roman M., Szech, Nora

“…A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases investments of contestants because of the “discouragement…”
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The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving by Sheremeta, Roman M., Uler, Neslihan

“…We examine how taxes impact charitable giving and how this relationship is affected by the degree of wasteful government spending. In our model, individuals…”
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Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies by Schniter, Eric, Sheremeta, Roman M., Sznycer, Daniel

“…► Promises and messages are used to build new trust and rebuild damaged trust. ► Promise-breakers use apologies and upgraded promises to restore damaged trust…”
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Loss aversion and the quantity–quality tradeoff by Rubin, Jared, Samek, Anya, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to…”
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Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes by Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Lee, Dongryul, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…•We analyze a group contest with a group-specific public good prize.•Only the highest effort within each group represents the group effort.•In equilibrium at…”
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Fight or Flight? Defending against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege by Deck, Cary, Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker's objective is to successfully win at…”
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Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests by Mago, Shakun D., Samak, Anya C., Sheremeta, Roman M.

“…We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find…”
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Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence by Shupp, Robert, Sheremeta, Roman M., Schmidt, David, Walker, James

“…•We examine behavior in single-prize, multiple-prize and proportional-prize contests.•We elicit preferences toward risk, ambiguity and losses.•Multiple-prize…”
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