Search Results - "Schmitz, Patrick W."

Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the Grossman–Hart–Mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for…”
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Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm by Müller, Daniel, Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post…”
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Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments…”
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The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused…”
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When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…Consider a government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) who can collaborate to provide a public good using physical assets. Who should be the owner of…”
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Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed?…”
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How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts by Schmitz, Patrick W

“…Abstract A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be…”
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Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm, ownership matters if parties have to make partly relationship-specific investments, but ownership…”
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Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot…”
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Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…•Two parties (A and B) can invest in the provision of a public good.•Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good?•Under symmetric…”
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Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that in an…”
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Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…A principal wants an agent to exert unobservable research effort. Ruling out negative payments implies that (i) the principal cannot punish bad outcomes and…”
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Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable,…”
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On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world…”
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Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the standard property rights theory, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single…”
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Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the Grossman–Hart–Moore property rights theory, there are no frictions ex post (i.e., after non-contractible investments have been sunk). In contrast, in…”
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Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is the most prominent application of the incomplete contracting paradigm. A central conclusion of the…”
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Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study by Nieken, Petra, Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is…”
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Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases by Oechssler, Jörg, Roider, Andreas, Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral…”
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Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions by Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an…”
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