Search Results - "Rosenberg, Dinah"

ON THE EFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL LEARNING by Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We revisit prominent learning models in which a sequence of agents make a binary decision on the basis of both a private signal and information related to past…”
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Zero-sum games with ambiguity by Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided…”
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Corrigendum to “Informational externalities and emergence of consensus” [Games Econ. Behav. 66 (2) (2009) 979–994] by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required…”
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On games of strategic experimentation by Rosenberg, Dinah, Salomon, Antoine, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to…”
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Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop…”
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Informational externalities and emergence of consensus by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and…”
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Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case by Cardaliaguet, Pierre, Rainer, Catherine, Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study the asymptotics of a class of two-player, zero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information on one side when the time span between two consecutive…”
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Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence by Lehrer, Ehud, Rosenberg, Dinah, Shmaya, Eran

“…In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature…”
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Signaling and mediation in games with common interests by Lehrer, Ehud, Rosenberg, Dinah, Shmaya, Eran

“…Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on…”
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Strategic information exchange by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems…”
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Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information by Cardaliaguet, Pierre, Rainer, Catherine, Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The…”
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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information by Hörner, Johannes, Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an…”
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Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides by De Meyer, Bernard, Lehrer, Ehud, Rosenberg, Dinah

“…We study zero-sum games with incomplete information and analyze the impact that the information players receive has on the payoffs. It turns out that the…”
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Protocols with no acknowledgment by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and…”
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Signaling and mediation in games with common interest by Rosenberg, Dinah, Lehrer, Ehud, Shmaya, Eran

“…Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on…”
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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information by Vieille, Nicolas, Hörner, Johannes, Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon

“…We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an…”
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Protocols with No Acknowledgment by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and…”
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Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces by Mertens, Jean-Francois, Neyman, Abraham, Rosenberg, Dinah

“…We prove that games with absorbing states with compact action sets have a value…”
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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information: Special Issue on Computational Economics by HÖRNER, Johannes, ROSENBERG, Dinah, SOLAN, Eilon, VIEILLE, Nicolas

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On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result…”
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