Search Results - "Peters, Dominik"

Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox by Peters, Dominik

“…We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at…”
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The DEAD-box RNA helicase DDX41 is a novel repressor of p21WAF1/CIP1 mRNA translation by Peters, Dominik, Radine, Claudia, Reese, Alina, Budach, Wilfried, Sohn, Dennis, Jänicke, Reiner U.

“…The cyclin-dependent kinase inhibitor p21 is an important player in stress pathways exhibiting both tumor-suppressive and oncogenic functions. Thus, expression…”
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Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle by Peters, Dominik, Lackner, Martin

“…We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference…”
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Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations by Brandl, Florian, Peters, Dominik

“…Approval voting allows every voter to cast a ballot of approved alternatives and chooses the alternatives with the largest number of approvals. Due to its…”
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An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule by Brandl, Florian, Peters, Dominik

“…A social dichotomy function maps a collection of weak orders to a set of dichotomous weak orders. Every dichotomous weak order partitions the set of…”
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Portioning using ordinal preferences: Fairness and efficiency by Airiau, Stéphane, Aziz, Haris, Caragiannis, Ioannis, Kruger, Justin, Lang, Jérôme, Peters, Dominik

“…A divisible public resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference…”
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Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving by Brandt, Felix, Geist, Christian, Peters, Dominik

“…One of the most important desirable properties in social choice theory is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative…”
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Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results by Peters, Dominik, Yu, Lan, Chan, Hau, Elkind, Edith

“…A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing…”
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Approval-based apportionment by Brill, Markus, Gölz, Paul, Peters, Dominik, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike, Wilker, Kai

“…In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a…”
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Truthful aggregation of budget proposals by Freeman, Rupert, Pennock, David M., Peters, Dominik, Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer

“…•Studies strategyproof aggregation of distributions of a budget among projects.•Introduces the class of moving phantom mechanisms.•Proves that the utilitarian…”
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The RNA-binding protein RBM47 is a novel regulator of cell fate decisions by transcriptionally controlling the p53-p21-axis by Radine, Claudia, Peters, Dominik, Reese, Alina, Neuwahl, Judith, Budach, Wilfried, Jänicke, Reiner U., Sohn, Dennis

“…In recent years it has become more and more apparent that the regulation of gene expression by RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) is of utmost importance for most…”
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Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles by Bilò, Vittorio, Caragiannis, Ioannis, Flammini, Michele, Igarashi, Ayumi, Monaco, Gianpiero, Peters, Dominik, Vinci, Cosimo, Zwicker, William S.

“…We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to…”
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Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule by Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Greger, Matthias, Peters, Dominik, Stricker, Christian, Suksompong, Warut

“…We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members…”
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Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections by Peters, Dominik

“…Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow…”
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Fair Division of the Commons by Peters, Dominik

“…A group of agents controls a common budget or owns some common resources. The agents need to decide how to divide this budget across various projects, or to…”
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miR-30e controls DNA damage-induced stress responses by modulating expression of the CDK inhibitor p21WAF1/CIP1 and caspase-3 by Sohn, Dennis, Peters, Dominik, Piekorz, Roland P, Budach, Wilfried, Jänicke, Reiner U

“…MicroRNAs (miRNAs), a class of small non-coding RNAs that usually cause gene silencing by translational repression or degradation of mRNAs, are implicated in…”
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Kinesin-5 Blocker Monastrol Protects Against Bortezomib-Induced Peripheral Neurotoxicity by Bobylev, Ilja, Peters, Dominik, Vyas, Maulik, Barham, Mohammed, Klein, Ines, von Strandmann, Elke Pogge, Neiss, Wolfram F., Lehmann, Helmar C.

“…Neurotoxicity is a relevant side effect of bortezomib treatment. Previous reports have shown that the development of peripheral neuropathy caused by…”
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Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences by Delemazure, Théo, Peters, Dominik

“…Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as…”
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In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins by Gölz, Paul, Peters, Dominik, Procaccia, Ariel D

“…Apportionment is the problem of distributing $h$ indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states' populations. In the context of the US House of…”
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The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings by Lederer, Patrick, Peters, Dominik, Wąs, Tomasz

“…For the problem of aggregating several rankings into one ranking, Kemeny (1959) proposed two methods: the median rule which selects the ranking with the…”
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