Search Results - "Parkes, D. C."

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    M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems by Petcu, A., Faltings, B., Parkes, D. C.

    “…In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a…”
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    Journal Article
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    Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents by Bredin, J. L., Parkes, D. C., Duong, Q.

    “…In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single…”
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    Journal Article
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    An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging by Robu, V., Gerding, E. H., Stein, S., Parkes, D. C., Rogers, A., Jennings, N. R.

    “…We develop an online mechanism for the allocation of an expiring resource to a dynamic agent population. Each agent has a non-increasing marginal valuation…”
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    Non-Cooperative Location Privacy by Freudiger, J., Manshaei, M. H., Hubaux, Jean-Pierre, Parkes, D. C.

    “…In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive for most security protocols. Unfortunately, an adversary can monitor pseudonyms used for…”
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    Computational-mechanism design: a call to arms by Dash, R.K., Jennings, N.R., Parkes, D.C.

    Published in IEEE intelligent systems (01-11-2003)
    “…Computational-mechanism design has an important role to play in developing complex distributed systems comprising multiple interacting agents. Game theory has…”
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    Journal Article
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    ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange by Lubin, B., Juda, A. I., Cavallo, R., Lahaie, S., Shneidman, J., Parkes, D. C.

    “…We present the design and analysis of the first fully expressive, iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding…”
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    Truth, justice, and cake cutting by Chen, Yiling, Lai, John K., Parkes, David C., Procaccia, Ariel D.

    Published in Games and economic behavior (01-01-2013)
    “…Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a…”
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    Approximate strategyproofness by Lubin, Benjamin, Parkes, David C.

    Published in Current science (Bangalore) (10-11-2012)
    “…The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive…”
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    Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents by Bredin, J. L, Duong, Q, Parkes, D. C

    Published 31-10-2011
    “…Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research, Volume 30, pages 133-179, 2007 In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of…”
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    Journal Article
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    Plasma concentrations of the oxime Pralidoxime Mesylate (P2S) after repeated oral and intramuscular administration by Holland, P, Parkes, D C

    Published in British Journal of Industrial Medicine (01-02-1976)
    “…The use of the oxime P2S as intravenous therapy for organophosphorus anticholinesterase poisoning is well known. In emergency situations this route of…”
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    Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds by Chun, B.N., Buonadonna, P., AuYoung, A., Chaki Ng, Parkes, D.C., Shneidman, J., Snoeren, A.C., Vahdat, A.

    “…In this paper, we argue that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management…”
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    Conference Proceeding
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    Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions by Parkes, David C, Kalagnanam, Jayant

    Published in Management science (01-03-2005)
    “…Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in…”
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    The cholinergic properties of some amino‐acid esters and amides by BARRASS, B. C., BRIMBLECOMBE, R. W., PARKES, D. C., RICH, P.

    Published in British journal of pharmacology (01-10-1968)
    “…1 Several amino‐acid esters and amides have been prepared and their toxicological and pharmacological properties have been investigated. Some of the quaternary…”
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    Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing by Shnayder, V., Hoon, J., Parkes, D. C., Kawadia, V.

    Published in 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM Workshops (01-03-2012)
    “…As the rapid expansion of smart phones and associated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see renewed interest in dynamic prioritization…”
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    Conference Proceeding
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    An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity by Corbo, J., Jain, S., Mitzenmacher, M., Parkes, D. C.

    Published in IEEE INFOCOM 2009 (01-04-2009)
    “…End-to-end packet delivery in the Internet is achieved through a system of interconnections between the network domains of independent entities called…”
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    Conference Proceeding
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    Auction design with costly preference elicitation by Parkes, David C.

    “…We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining…”
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    Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions by Kothari, Anshul, Parkes, David C., Suri, Subhash

    Published in Decision Support Systems (01-03-2005)
    “…We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language…”
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    Journal Article Conference Proceeding
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