Search Results - "Olivella, Pau"

Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection by Olivella, Pau, Vera-Hernández, Marcos

“…Market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre-paid health plans. However, most of the literature on adverse selection…”
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Reputational concerns with altruistic providers by Olivella, Pau, Siciliani, Luigi

“…•We investigate providers with monetary, altruistic and reputational concerns.•Reputational concerns lead less altruistic doctors to mimic more altruistic…”
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Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market by Olivella, Pau, Schroyen, Fred

“…We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion, and solve for the…”
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Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance by Olivella, Pau, Vera-Hernández, Marcos

“…We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private…”
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Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets by McFadden, Daniel, Noton, Carlos, Olivella, Pau

“…We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true…”
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Shifting public-health-sector waiting lists to the private sector by Olivella, Pau

“…I analyze the public health administration's (PbHA's) decisions on waiting lists for public treatments. The PbHA maximizes a utilitarian social welfare…”
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External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation by Garcia Mariñoso, Begoña, Jelovac, Izabela, Olivella, Pau

“…External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign…”
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How complex are the contracts offered by health plans? by Olivella, Pau, Vera-Hernandez, Marcos

“…When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among…”
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Waiting Lists and Patient Selection by Barros, Pedro Pita, Olivella, Pau

“…We develop a positive model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians are able to divert patients from the public to the private sector. Public…”
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The industrial organization of health care V by Dafny, Leemore S, Cawley, John, Chernew, Michael, McLaughlin, Catherine, Kessler, Daniel P, Geppert, Jeffrey J, Dormont, Brigitte, Milcent, Carine, Barros, Pedro Pita, Olivella, Pau, Chalkley, Martin, Tilley, Colin, Smith, Richard B, Iizuka, Toshiaki, Jin, Ginger Zhe, Huskamp, Haiden A, Frank, Richard G, McGuigan, Kimberly A, Zhang, Yuting, Wang, Y Richard, Pauly, Mark V

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Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion by Macho-Stadler, Inés, Olivella, Pau, Pérez-Castrillo, David

“…We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes…”
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Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring by Olivella, Pau

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Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems by Aron, Debra J, Olivella, Pau

“…This article reconciles the psychological notion of bonuses and penalties as incentive devices with an economic view of incentives. An objective definition of…”
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