Search Results - "Mathevet, Laurent"

Supermodular mechanism design by Mathevet, Laurent A

“…This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded…”
Get full text

An axiomatization of plays in repeated games by Mathevet, Laurent

“…Suppose that, in repeated games, players eventually engage in a pattern of action profiles, which we call a convention. Do some conventions seem more plausible…”
Get full text

Disclosure to a Psychological Audience by Lipnowski, Elliot, Mathevet, Laurent

“…We study how a benevolent expert should disclose information to an agent with psychological concerns. We first provide a method to compute an optimal…”
Get full text

Optimal attention management: A tractable framework by Lipnowski, Elliot, Mathevet, Laurent, Wei, Dong

“…A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever…”
Get full text

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities by Mathevet, Laurent

“…We propose two characteristics of beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The…”
Get full text

Tractable dynamic global games and applications by Mathevet, Laurent, Steiner, Jakub

“…We present a family of tractable dynamic global games and its applications. Agents privately learn about a fixed fundamental, and repeatedly adjust their…”
Get full text

Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations by Mathevet, Laurent, Taneva, Ina

“…This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary (finite) type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the…”
Get full text

contraction principle for finite global games by Mathevet, Laurent

“…I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The…”
Get full text

Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments by Healy, Paul J, Mathevet, Laurent

“…We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive…”
Get full text

Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments by Healy, Paul J, Mathevet, Laurent

“…We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive…”
Get full text

Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects: Session at the 9th Triennial Choice Symposium by Borkovsky, Ron N., Ellickson, Paul B., Gordon, Brett R., Aguirregabiria, Victor, Gardete, Pedro, Grieco, Paul, Gureckis, Todd, Ho, Teck-Hua, Mathevet, Laurent, Sweeting, Andrew

“…Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real-world…”
Get full text

Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects by Borkovsky, Ron N, Ellickson, Paul B, Gordon, Brett R, Aguirregabiria, Victor, Gardete, Pedro, Grieco, Paul, Gureckis, Todd, Ho, Teck-hua, Mathevet, Laurent, Sweeting, Andrew

“…Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real-world…”
Get full text

Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes by Jackson, Matthew O.

Get full text

Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework by Lipnowski, Elliot, Mathevet, Laurent, Wei, Dong

“…A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever…”
Get full text

Selection, Learning, and Nomination: Essays on Supermodular Games, Design, and Political Theory by Mathevet, Laurent

“…Games with strategic complementarities (GSC) possess nice properties in terms of learning and structure of the equilibria. Two major concerns in the theory of…”
Get full text

Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes by Jackson, Mathew O, Mathevet, Laurent, Mattes, Kyle

“…We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party…”
Get full text