Search Results - "Lambson, V E"

Sunk costs, entry, and the timing of cost-reducing investment by Lambson, Val E

“…The traditional IO literature asserts that firms with monopoly power produce less efficiently than competitive firms and that they often reduce costs only…”
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Skill, complexity and strategic behavior by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…Boundedly rational players with differing skill are affected differently by complexity. Thus players have preferences for complexity that depend on their own…”
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A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames by Lambson, Val E.

“…Optimal penal codes are security level penal codes in a large class of stochastic Bertrand supergames…”
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Market structure and Schumpeterian growth by Lambson, Val E., Phillips, Kerk L.

“…We present a discrete-time version of a Schumpeterian growth model. A natural R&D analogue to constant returns to scale implies a Poisson production function…”
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On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets by Amir, Rabah, Lambson, Val E.

“…In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively…”
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Lockups Revisited by Brau, James C., Lambson, Val E., McQueen, Grant

“…Lockups are agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue. Brav and Gompers…”
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Do Out-of-State Buyers Pay More for Real Estate? An Examination of Anchoring-Induced Bias and Search Costs by Lambson, Val E., McQueen, Grant R., Slade, Barrett A.

“…We explore the questions of whether and why out‐of‐state buyers pay more for real estate than their in‐state counterparts. Theoretically, we develop a model…”
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Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…Previous work has demonstrated that optimal penal codes are security level penal codes in symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints. This paper…”
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Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run by Amir, Rabah, Lambson, Val E.

“…An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the…”
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SUNK COSTS, PROFIT VARIABILITY, AND TURNOVER by GSCHWANDTNER, ADELINA, LAMBSON, VAL E.

“…Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution suggest that firm profit will be more volatile, and turnover lower, in industries with higher sunk costs…”
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The effects of sunk costs on entry and exit: evidence from 36 countries by Gschwandtner, Adelina, Lambson, Val E.

“…Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution suggest that intertemporal variability of the number of firms should be lower in industries with higher sunk…”
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Learning, decision making and behavior by Cheung, Y.-W., Friedman, D, Richards, D, Hays, J C, Sonnemans, J, Gallego, A G, Lambson, V E, Wilson, B J, Frohlich, N, Oppenheimer, J

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Learning by matching patterns by Lambson, Val E., Probst, Daniel A.

“…We analyze a model of repeated play between two boundedly rational agents. In each stage each player recalls the outcomes from the most recent few rounds,…”
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Sunk Costs and Firm Value Variability: Theory and Evidence by Lambson, Val Eugene, Jensen, Farrell E.

“…Dynamic competitive models are interesting tools for studying industry behavior over time. Although there is some overlap, such models of industry evolution…”
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Competitive Profits in the Long Run by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…Profit rates differ across industries. Explanations have often relied on static models of imperfect competition. This paper develops a dynamic model of perfect…”
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Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…Optimal penal codes are constructed for a class of infinitely repeated games with discounting. These games can be interpreted as Bertrand oligopoly games with…”
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Is the Concentration-Profit Correlation Partly an Artifact of Lumpy Technology? by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…The "efficient structure hypothesis" asserts that market concentration results because more efficient firms are able to capture larger market shares and…”
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Sunk costs and the variability of firm value over time by Lambson, V.E, Jensen, F.E

“…Empirical implications for the variability of firm value in various models of industry evolution are discussed. Under certain conditions, learning models imply…”
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Dynamic Behaviour in Large Markets for Differentiated Products by Lambson, Val Eugene

“…An important question is how well competitive models approximate models of large finite economies. For a class of differentiated products models static Nash…”
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