Search Results - "Hoppe, Eva I"

Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed?…”
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Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot…”
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Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private…”
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How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects by Hoppe, Eva I, Schmitz, Patrick W

“…The government wants an infrastructure-based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated…”
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Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to…”
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Behavioral biases and cognitive reflection by Hoppe, Eva I., Kusterer, David J.

“…In a large-scale laboratory experiment, we investigate whether subjects' scores on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) are related to their susceptibility to…”
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Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation by Hoppe, Eva I., Kusterer, David J., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…► We conduct a laboratory experiment on public procurement. ► An infrastructure must be built and operated. ► In public-private partnerships (PPPs), building…”
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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study by HOPPE, EVA I., SCHMITZ, PATRICK W.

“…Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted…”
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Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the…”
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Observability of information acquisition in agency models by Hoppe, Eva I.

“…We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. In scenario I, information…”
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Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence by Hoppe, Eva I., Kusterer, David J.

“…We study a multi-task principal-agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other. In theory, it is difficult to induce a single agent to…”
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The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures by Hoppe, Eva I., Schmitz, Patrick W.

“…We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes…”
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