Search Results - "Heydemann, Karine"

Editorial about PROOFS 2019 by Heydemann, Karine, Li, Letitia

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Correction to: Editorial about PROOFS 2019 by Heydemann, Karine, Li, Letitia

“…A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-021-00266-7…”
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A Tale of Resilience: On the Practical Security of Masked Software Implementations by Casalino, Lorenzo, Belleville, Nicolas, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine

“…Masking constitutes a provably-secure approach against side-channel attacks. However, recombination effects (e.g., transitions) severely reduce the proven…”
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Fault-Resistant Partitioning of Secure CPUs for System Co-Verification against Faults by Tollec, Simon, Hadži´c, Vedad, Nasahl, Pascal, Asavoae, Mihail, Bloem, Roderick, Couroussé, Damien, Heydemann, Karine, Jan, Mathieu, Mangard, Stefan

“…Fault injection attacks are a serious threat to system security, enabling attackers to bypass protection mechanisms or access sensitive information. To…”
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Electromagnetic Fault Injection: Towards a Fault Model on a 32-bit Microcontroller by Moro, Nicolas, Dehbaoui, Amine, Heydemann, Karine, Robisson, Bruno, Encrenaz, Emmanuelle

“…Injection of transient faults as a way to attack cryptographic implementations has been largely studied in the last decade. Several attacks that use…”
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MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks by Chamelot, Thomas, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine

“…Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage…”
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LeakageVerif: Efficient and Scalable Formal Verification of Leakage in Symbolic Expressions by Meunier, Quentin L., Pons, Etienne, Heydemann, Karine

“…Side-channel attacks are a powerful class of attacks targeting cryptographic devices. Masking is a popular protection technique to thwart such attacks as it…”
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ARMISTICE: Micro-Architectural Leakage Modelling for Masked Software Formal Verification by de Grandmaison, Arnaud, Heydemann, Karine, Meunier, Quentin L.

“…Side channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements such as power consumption or electromagnetic…”
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ARMISTICE: Microarchitectural Leakage Modeling for Masked Software Formal Verification by Grandmaison, Arnaud de, Heydemann, Karine, Meunier, Quentin L.

“…Side-channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements, such as power consumption or electromagnetic…”
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Formally verified software countermeasures for control-flow integrity of smart card C code by Heydemann, Karine, Lalande, Jean-François, Berthomé, Pascal

“…Fault attacks can target smart card programs to disrupt an execution and take control of the data or the embedded functionalities. Among all possible attacks,…”
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SCI-FI: Control Signal, Code, and Control Flow Integrity against Fault Injection Attacks by Chamelot, Thomas, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine

“…Fault injection attacks have become a serious threat against embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that some faults inside the…”
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Scalable task parallelism for NUMA: A uniform abstraction for coordinated scheduling and memory management by Drebes, Andi, Pop, Antoniu, Heydemann, Karine, Cohen, Albert, Drach, Nathalie

“…Dynamic task-parallel programming models are popular on shared-memory systems, promising enhanced scalability, load balancing and locality. Yet these promises…”
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Maskara: Compilation of a Masking Countermeasure With Optimized Polynomial Interpolation by Belleville, Nicolas, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine, Meunier, Quentin, El Ouahma, Ines Ben

“…Side-channel attacks are amongst the major threats for embedded systems and IoT devices. Masking is one of the most used countermeasure against such attacks,…”
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Formal verification of a software countermeasure against instruction skip attacks by Moro, N., Heydemann, K., Encrenaz, E., Robisson, B.

“…Fault attacks against embedded circuits enabled to define many new attack paths against secure circuits. Every attack path relies on a specific fault model…”
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Side-channel robustness analysis of masked assembly codes using a symbolic approach by Ben El Ouahma, Inès, Meunier, Quentin L., Heydemann, Karine, Encrenaz, Emmanuelle

“…Masking is a popular countermeasure against side-channel attacks, which randomizes secret data with random and uniform variables called masks. At software…”
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MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks by Chamelot, Thomas, Couroussé, Damien, Heydemann, Karine

“…IEEE TCAD (2023) Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks…”
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μARCHIFI: Formal Modeling and Verification Strategies for Microarchitectural Fault Injections by Tollec, Simon, Asavoae, Mihail, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine, Jan, Mathieu

“…This paper introduces μARCHiFI, an open-source tool dedicated to the formal modeling and verification of microarchitecture-level fault injections and their…”
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Exploration of Fault Effects on Formal RISC-V Microarchitecture Models by Tollec, Simon, Asavoae, Mihail, Courousse, Damien, Heydemann, Karine, Jan, Mathieu

“…This paper introduces a formal workflow for modeling software/hardware systems in order to explore the effects of fault injections and evaluate the robustness…”
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Secure Optimization Through Opaque Observations by Vu, Son Tuan, Cohen, Albert, Heydemann, Karine, de Grandmaison, Arnaud, Guillon, Christophe

“…Secure applications implement software protections against side-channel and physical attacks. Such protections are meaningful at machine code or…”
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Studying EM Pulse Effects on Superscalar Microarchitectures at ISA Level by Proy, Julien, Heydemann, Karine, Majéric, Fabien, Cohen, Albert, Berzati, Alexandre

“…In the area of physical attacks, system-on-chip (SoC) designs have not received the same level of attention as simpler micro-controllers. We try to model the…”
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