Search Results - "Hagerty, Kathleen M."

The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations by DeMarzo, Peter M., Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…Regulating insider trading lessens the adverse selection problem facing market makers, enabling them to quote better prices. An Optimal enforcement policy must…”
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Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers by Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of sellers' information. This article analyzes two questions regarding disclosure: (i) Why wouldn't sellers voluntarily…”
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Self-Regulation and Government Oversight by DeMarzo, Peter M., Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to…”
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The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure by Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…In this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some, but not all, of his information. The optimal amount of discretion to allow the…”
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Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency by FISHMAN, MICHAEL J., HAGERTY, KATHLEEN M.

“…This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown…”
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Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices by Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…We analyze several aspects of the debate on insider trading regulations. Critics of such regulations cite various benefits of insider trading. One prominent…”
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The Mandatory Disclosure of Trades and Market Liquidity by Fishman, Michael J., Hagerty, Kathleen M.

“…Financial market regulations require various "insiders" to disclose their trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatory disclosure rules can…”
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The Incentive to Sell Financial Market Information by Fishman, M.J., Hagerty, K.M.

“…Investment advisory firms and brokerage firms hire analysts to uncover profitable securities investment opportunities. Then these firms sell the information…”
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Preventing Crime Waves by Bond, Philip, Hagerty, Kathleen

“…We study the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement resources are chosen ex ante and are inelastic ex post. Multiple equilibria arise naturally. We…”
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On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection by Hagerty, Kathleen M., Siegel, Daniel R.

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Self-Regulation and Government Oversight by DeMarzo, Peter M, Fishman, Michael J, Hagerty, Kathleen M

“…Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to…”
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Equilibrium Bid-Ask Spreads in Markets with Multiple Assets by Hagerty, Kathleen

“…The paper models the specialist system as a monopolistically competitive market. The demand for the asset is found by solving the investor's portfolio problem…”
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The optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure by Fishman, Michael J, Hagerty, Kathleen M

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Disclosure Decisions By Firms And The Competition For Price by Fishman, Michael J, Hagerty, Kathleen M

“…A model was developed of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It was…”
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On The Observational Equivalence Of Managerial Contracts Un by Hagerty, Kathleen M, Siegel, Daniel R

“…Two models of contracting under asymmetric information (moral hazard and self selection) are used to explain the phenomenon of managerial contracts often tying…”
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