Groups Have Aims & That Gives Us Reasons
I present a novel theory of the nature and origins of normative reasons - including reasons of morality, of self-interested practical rationality, of epistemic rationality, and of additional kinds. The view seeks to fulfill two of the main motivations that generally attract philosophers to antireali...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Dissertation |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Ann Arbor
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses
2018
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | I present a novel theory of the nature and origins of normative reasons - including reasons of morality, of self-interested practical rationality, of epistemic rationality, and of additional kinds. The view seeks to fulfill two of the main motivations that generally attract philosophers to antirealist views of normativity, such as Moral Relativism and Subjectivism about normative reasons. These are considerations regarding the epistemology of moral judgments and the prevalence of intercultural moral disagreement.
Yet existing antirealist views have difficulty accommodating, at once, a number of commonsense claims about the distinctive character of different kinds of normative reasons and about the relationships they bear to one another. For example, the force of one's moral reasons should never be outweighed by the force of one's practical reasons in cases where one more strongly desires to do something other than what is morally required. This is a claim with which Subjectivist views are incompatible. Additionally, what we have moral reason to do is not determined exclusively by social custom or convention. This is a claim with which certain Moral Relativist views are incompatible.
I show how we can develop a fruitful new theory that vindicates these intuitions about the nature of our different kinds of normative reasons by invoking the idea of group agency. That is, whole groups of people, such as societies, can be genuine agents in their own right. I hold that the different kinds of normative reasons that we recognize intuitively are distinguished by the fact that they apply directly to different sorts of agents. For each kind of reason, the content of those reasons - what it is in particular that they call upon the agent to do - is fixed in connection with the aims of the relevant agent. For example, I take moral reasons to be a kind of reason that applies directly to societies in light of the societies' aims. These moral reasons, which also apply derivatively to each member of the society, are distinct from self-interested reasons of practical rationality, which apply directly to persons in light of their own individual interests. I take epistemic reasons to apply directly to groups, as well. This appeal to different sorts of group agents, and to their different aims, thus allows for the articulation of a novel, unified account of the many different kinds of normative reasons that we possess. This theory avoids some of the less attractive features of existing forms of normative antirealism, while still holding out the promise of fulfilling many of the same philosophical motivations. |
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| Bibliography: | Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A. Philosophy. Adviser: Paul Boghossian. |
| ISBN: | 0438170830 9780438170834 |