Search Results - "Cramton, Peter"

Electricity market design by Cramton, Peter

“…Electricity markets are designed to provide reliable electricity at least cost to consumers. This paper describes how the best designs satisfy the twin goals…”
Get full text

Spectrum Auction Design by Cramton, Peter

“…Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending…”
Get full text

THE HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING ARMS RACE: FREQUENT BATCH AUCTIONS AS A MARKET DESIGN RESPONSE by Budish, Eric, Cramton, Peter, Shim, John

“…The high-frequency trading arms race is a symptom of flawed market design. Instead of the continuous limit order book market design that is currently…”
Get full text

THE GERMAN 4G SPECTRUM AUCTION: DESIGN AND BEHAVIOUR by Cramton, Peter, Ockenfels, Axel

“…The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was…”
Get full text

Capacity Market Fundamentals by CRAMTON, PETER, OCKENFELS, AXEL, STOFT, STEVEN

“…Electricity capacity markets work in tandem with electricity energy markets to ensure that investors build adequate capacity in line with consumer preferences…”
Get full text

Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions by Day, Robert W., Cramton, Peter

“…We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the…”
Get full text

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions by AUSUBEL, LAWRENCE M., CRAMTON, PETER, PYCIA, MAREK, ROSTEK, MARZENA, WERETKA, MAREK

“…Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal…”
Get full text

Open access wireless markets by Cramton, Peter, Doyle, Linda

“…This paper describes an open access market for capacity. Open access means that in real-time, network capacity cannot be withheld—capacity is priced…”
Get full text

Implementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye by Budish, Eric, Cramton, Peter, Shim, John

“…Our recent research (Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2013) proposes frequent batch auctions - uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions conducted at frequent but…”
Get full text

An open-access market for global communications by Cramton, Peter, Bohlin, Erik, Brandkamp, Simon, Dark, Jason, Hoy, Darrell, Kyle, Albert S., Malec, David, Ockenfels, Axel, Wilkens, Chris

“…An open-access market design is presented to manage network congestion and optimize network use and value. Open access eliminates the walled-garden approach;…”
Get full text

An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation by CRAMTON, PETER, OCKENFELS, AXEL, STOFT, STEVEN

“…To promote cooperation in international climate negotiations, negotiators should focus on a common commitment. Such commitments have the advantage of…”
Get full text

Strategic Climate Cooperation and Greenhouse Gas Price Coordination by Clausing, Kimberly A, Cramton, Peter C, Ockenfels, Axel, Wolfram, Catherine D

Get full text

Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather by Cramton, Peter, Kerr, Suzi

“…An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits…”
Get full text

Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency by Cramton, Peter, Stoft, Steven

“…A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled…”
Get full text

DESIGNED TO FAIL: THE MEDICARE AUCTION FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT by Cramton, Peter, Ellermeyer, Sean, Katzman, Brett

“…We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are…”
Get full text

Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets by Cramton, Peter, Stoft, Steven

“…Arguments that the uniform-price auction yields electricity prices that are systematically too high are incorrect. Tampering with the spot price would cause…”
Get full text

COP28: Strategische Klimakooperation by Clausing, Kimberly A, Cramton, Peter C, Ockenfels, Axel, Wolfram, Catherine D

Get full text

Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia by Betz, Regina, Seifert, Stefan, Cramton, Peter, Kerr, Suzi

“…The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of…”
Get full text

Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study by Cramton, Peter, Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, Ozbay, Erkut Y., Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut

“…We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and…”
Get full text

AUCTIONING MANY DIVISIBLE GOODS by Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter

“…We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to…”
Get full text