Search Results - "Compte, Olivier"

Confidence-Enhanced Performance by Compte, Olivier, Postlewaite, Andrew

“…There is ample evidence that emotions affect performance. Positive emotions can improve performance, while negative ones can diminish it. For example, the…”
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Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…We study collective search processes in which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance…”
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Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats? by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…The value of an asset is generally not known a priori, and it requires costly investments to be discovered. In such contexts with endogenous information…”
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On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private by Compte, Olivier

“…I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show…”
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The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players' payoffs is maximal. We consider a…”
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Plausible cooperation by Compte, Olivier, Postlewaite, Andrew

“…There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of the earlier literature assumes…”
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Belief formation and the persistence of biased beliefs by Compte, Olivier

“…We propose a belief-formation model where agents attempt to discriminate between two theories, and where the asymmetry in strength between confirming and…”
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Endogenous Barriers to Learning by Compte, Olivier

“…Motivated by the idea that lack of experience is a source of errors but that experience should reduce them, we model agents' behavior using a stochastic choice…”
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Q-learning with biased policy rules by Compte, Olivier

“…In dynamic environments, Q-learning is an automaton that (i) provides estimates (Q-values) of the continuation values associated with each available action;…”
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On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

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Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring by Compte, Olivier

“…This paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played, and in which players are allowed to…”
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Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling ? by Compte, Olivier, Lamy, Laurent, Laurent, Emmanuel

“…We consider the issue of allotment design: goods are divisible and may be cut into various possibly heterogeneous lots. We investigate conditions under which…”
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Consensus and Disagreement: Information Aggregation under (not so) Naive Learning by Banerjee, Abhijit, Compte, Olivier

“…We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively choose among Friedkin-Johnsen type aggregation rules to…”
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Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the…”
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Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each party can opt out at any time, and…”
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Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion by Compte, Olivier, Jenny, Frédéric, Rey, Patrick

“…The objective of this paper is two-fold: to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and,…”
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Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…The value of an asset is generally not known a priori, and it requires costly investments to be discovered. In such contexts with endogenous information…”
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Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…A principal has to choose among several agents to fulfill a task and then provide the right incentives to perform it. Agents do not a priori know how competent…”
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Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions by Compte, O., Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., Verdier, T.

“…We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if…”
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THE WAIT-AND-SEE OPTION IN ASCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS by Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe

“…Ascending auctions offer agents the option to wait and see before deciding to drop out. We show that in contexts where as time proceeds agents get finer and…”
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