Search Results - "Brink, René van den"

Axiomatizations of the proportional division value by Zou, Zhengxing, van den Brink, René, Chun, Youngsub, Funaki, Yukihiko

“…We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the…”
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Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions by van den Brink, René, Chun, Youngsub, Funaki, Yukihiko, Zou, Zhengxing

“…•We generalize balanced cost reduction (BCR) for queueing games to TU-games.•BCR and efficiency are compatible only on classes of 2-games.•A weaker version of…”
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The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs by Brink, René van den, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

“…•We axiomatize the ranking by degree ratio for directed graphs using a clone property.•We provide a comparable axiomatization of the ranking by Copeland score…”
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Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions by van den Brink, René

“…A famous solution for cooperative transferable utility games is the Shapley value. Most axiomatic characterizations of this value use some axiom related to…”
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The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures by van den Brink, René, Levínský, René, Zelený, Miroslav

“…In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize…”
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Sharing the surplus and proportional values by Zou, Zhengxing, van den Brink, René, Funaki, Yukihiko

“…We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth…”
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Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies by van den Brink, René, Dimitrov, Dinko, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

“…We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a…”
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Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values by van den Brink, René, Funaki, Yukihiko

“…In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274-294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley…”
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Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games by van den Brink, René, Chun, Youngsub, Funaki, Yukihiko, Park, Boram

“…A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we…”
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Moore interval subtraction and interval solutions for TU-games by Gök, S. Zeynep Alparslan, Brink, René van den, Palancı, Osman

“…Standard solutions for cooperative transferable utility (TU-) games assign to every player in a TU-game a real number representing the player’s payoff. In this…”
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The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs by van den Brink, René, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

“…•We provide a utility foundation of combinations of out- and indegree for directed graphs.•We provide a utility foundation of the degree measure for undirected…”
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Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games by van den Brink, René, Funaki, Yukihiko

“…A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility , or…”
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Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties by van den Brink, René, Funaki, Yukihiko, van der Laan, Gerard

“…► We weaken Exemption and Exclusion for bankruptcy rules in a compatible way. ► We show that the Reverse Talmud (RT) rule satisfies these properties. ► We…”
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Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games by van den Brink, René, Dietz, Chris, van der Laan, Gerard, Xu, Genjiu

“…In the field of cooperative games, there is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation. In a communication graph game, players…”
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Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river by Li, Wenzhong, Xu, Genjiu, van den Brink, René

“…Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of…”
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On α-constant-sum games by Wang, Wenna, Brink, René van den, Sun, Hao, Xu, Genjiu, Zou, Zhengxing

“…Given any α ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] , an α -constant-sum game (abbreviated as α -CS game) on a finite set of players, N , is a function that assigns a real number to any…”
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Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure by van den Brink, René, He, Simin, Huang, Jia-Ping

“…When a polluted river passes through several different regions, a challenging question is how should the costs for cleaning the river be shared among the…”
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Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values by Zou, Zhengxing, van den Brink, René

“…We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under…”
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Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation by van den Brink, René, Dietz, Chris

“…It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted)…”
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The Family of Ideal Values for Cooperative Games by Wang, Wenna, Sun, Hao, van den Brink, René, Xu, Genjiu

“…In view of the nature of pursuing profit, a selfish coefficient function is employed to describe the degrees of selfishness of players in different coalitions,…”
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