American and British college students' epistemological beliefs about research on psychological and biological development
Epistemological beliefs about the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge are often assumed to be similar across different domains of knowledge. This assumption was tested by comparing beliefs about scientific research on psychological and biological development. Undergraduates from the United Stat...
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Published in: | Journal of applied developmental psychology Vol. 23; no. 6; pp. 625 - 642 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Norwood, NJ
Elsevier Inc
01-01-2003
Elsevier |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Epistemological beliefs about the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge are often assumed to be similar across different domains of knowledge. This assumption was tested by comparing beliefs about scientific research on psychological and biological development. Undergraduates from the United States and the United Kingdom responded to a set of epistemologically relevant statements about each field and then compared the two fields directly in terms of their confidence in the conclusions and advice of experts. On all measures, more negative beliefs were expressed about research on psychological development. Although U.S. students were more skeptical about both fields, U.S. and U.K. students displayed similar response patterns. To justify their skepticism toward scientific research as a valid source of knowledge about psychological development, students in both countries gave similar reasons (e.g., the difficulty in accurately measuring psychological variables). These results demonstrate that epistemological beliefs can differ substantially between two closely related fields. They also highlight issues that must be addressed to make education about the validity of research in developmental psychology more effective. |
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ISSN: | 0193-3973 1873-7900 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0193-3973(03)00002-9 |